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James Buchanan and Ideals of Manhood in the Election of 1856

“No other man but Mr. Buchanan could have been elected with the opposition we have
encountered at the North. He was the most suitable man for the times.”

Introduction
In 1995, Gail Bederman published her groundbreaking monograph Manliness and
Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917. In
this study she defined manhood not as “an unchanging essence inherent in all malebodied humans” but as a “historical, ideological process” that is constantly being made
and remade.1 Manliness and Civilization investigated this historical process, specifically
how late 19th and early 20th century Americans succeeded in redefining ideal manhood.
In one case study, Bederman charted a process of American society moving from an ideal
of manhood defined by self-restraint to one more in line with the active rough and tumble
behavior epitomized by President Theodore Roosevelt.2 Bederman charted how a young
Roosevelt “masculinized his image” and transformed himself from an eastern elitist “Jane
Dandy” to the “cowboy of the Dakotas.”3 Not only did TR remake his own image to fit
this ideal of manhood, but he also encouraged other men to remake their manhood as
well, concerned that their “fighting virtues” could be diminished by too much self-

1
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restraint.4 Bederman argued that Roosevelt “urged the men of the American race to live
the sort of life he had modeled for them: to be virile, vigorous, and manly, and to reject
the over-civilized decadence by supporting a strenuously imperialistic foreign policy.”5
According to Bederman, it was not just personality traits that marked someone as
upholding ideal manhood, but the policy positions they adopted as well.
Writing in 2008, historian Kevin Murphy built upon Bederman’s claims. In his
book, Political Manhood, Murphy agreed that “by the turn of the twentieth-century, a
red-blooded Rooseveltian model of masculinity proved ascendant and functioned as a
prescriptive ideal for American men.”6 Further, Murphy argued that there were
“competing ideologies of manhood” during the Progressive Era and that “the strenuous
model [of manhood] was deployed in order to marginalize the careers and projects of
political actors successfully stigmatized as weak and effeminate.”7 Not only was a new
ideal of manhood being upheld, but it was being weaponized as well. There was a
political cost to those who found themselves on the wrong side of the new ascendant
ideal of manhood.
Crucial to Murphy’s study was the cultural construction of the homosexual
identity during the Progressive Era.8 He maintained that the political actors of his study
were able to be successfully stigmatized “through a powerful correlation of weakness and
effeminacy with homosexuality at the turn of the century.”9
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This study seeks to build upon the work of these scholars. If Bederman and
Murphy’s “continual, dynamic process” of defining manhood operated during the
Progressive Era, this process should be observable during the Antebellum Era as well,
before Theodore Roosevelt’s strenuous life became ascendant and before a homosexual
identity came into being.10 Further, as Murphy found during the Progressive Era, there is
evidence that competing ideals of manhood were weaponized for political gain in the
Antebellum Era as well. Before there was a homosexual label to threaten political actors
with, how were ideals of manhood weaponized? Were these tactics successful?
Where Bederman used President Theodore Roosevelt (among others) as case
studies, this paper will examine the competition between different ideals of manhood
through the lens of the American presidential election of 1856, when the bachelor
candidate James Buchanan defeated John Fremont at the polls. What role, if any, did
Buchanan’s bachelorhood play in the campaign? What can it tell us about ideals of
manhood at the time?
A presidential election is a useful lens with which to uncover contemporary ideals
of manhood. Inherently competitive, these contests provide numerous primary resources
with which to evaluate how different campaigns navigated and weaponized ideals of
manhood, as well as providing a clear winner among competing ideals. Presidential
historian Jackson Katz wrote as much in his 2013 study Leading Men: Presidential
Campaigns and the Politics of Manhood. According to Katz, “Presidential campaigns
function as symbolic contests over competing definitions of ‘real manhood,’ and thus
over what kind of man can, and should be, in charge.”11 Like Bederman, he also believed
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that “this does not mean that image is everything and issues don’t matter. Voters make
judgments about a candidate’s manhood based on both his personal attributes and his
positions on certain key issues.”12 Bederman saw imperialism as the political issue
around which manhood was debated during the Progressive Era; in the Antebellum Era
the key issue was the future of slavery.
Historian Michael D. Pierson examined the intersection of gender and politics
during the Antebellum Era in his 2003 study entitled Free Hearts and Free Homes:
Gender and American Antislavery Politics. Pierson’s monograph investigated the role
gender ideals played within the Republican Party and its precursors going back to the
1830s. While being careful to note that disparate ideals of gender did not cause the Civil
War, Pierson maintained that they certainly contributed to its outbreak. In his
introduction Pierson argued that:
To be sure, political parties and voters cared about many issues; gender
concerns were only a part of what made a person join one of the parties.
But parties did consistently try to exploit the gender beliefs of their
constituents as they carefully crafted campaign biographies, newspaper
editorials, and the gendered division of labor at rallies to appeal to
voters…Such dramatic social and rhetorical divisions on personal issues
like gender roles and family structures helped to produce the image that
two very different societies were in competition with each other. Driven
apart by a host of legislative issues, the anti-slavery parties and the South
were further separated by their gender politics. With moral and personal
issues very much on the line, civil war was that much more imaginable for
American voters and their families.13

Similarly, ideals of manhood were not the defining aspect of the election of 1856 but, as
will be seen, they definitely played a significant role during the campaign. Pierson’s
chapter on the election of 1856 is especially relevant to this paper. His investigation of
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the campaign literature showed that the nascent Republican Party certainly saw
Buchanan’s distance from particular ideals of manhood as an exploitable issue that might
make Fremont appear more attractive to voters by comparison. The focus of Pierson’s
monograph was on the antislavery parties though so it spent little time investigating how
Buchanan and his supporters in the Democratic Party also “tried to exploit the gender
beliefs of their constituents” in order to win the White House.14 Most examinations of
the election paint the Democrats as only playing defense when it came to Buchanan and
projections of ideal manhood. Campaign materials suggest a more complex story.
Supporters of the Democratic nominee, as well as Buchanan himself, actively promoted
their own distinct masculine ideal just as much as the Republicans promoted theirs.
Lastly, Lorien Foote’s study of manhood during the Civil War, The Gentlemen
and the Roughs: Violence, Honor, and Manhood in the Union Army, shared Pierson’s
conclusion that Northern and Southern states held competing gender ideals. Foote also
claimed that there were competing ideals within just Northern states during the Civil
War. Writing in 2010, she argued:

The relatively coherent manhood ideal of southern men for the most part
stemmed from the centrality of slavery to southern society and reflected
the south’s more rural and traditional nature. Northerners, who
experienced transformative social and economic changes during the
antebellum era, developed a variety of manly ideals that reflected both the
social diversity of the region and the new class structures that
accompanied modern life.15

Using previously overlooked sources such as testimony during court martial proceedings
within the army, Foote demonstrated that a robust debate existed among men throughout

14
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the Northern states about what constituted ideal manhood just a few years after the
election of 1856. The monograph’s focus on the North (similar to Pierson’s look at
political parties that were antislavery) is particularly useful in relation to examining the
election of 1856. While it is easy to understand why the South supported the Democratic
ticket due to the party’s support of slavery, it is less self-evident why enough Northern
men backed the Democratic candidate to win him the election.
Foote also joined other gender scholars in admitting that, no matter the era under
discussion, “all men cannot fit into the neat categories [that fellow historians] have
devised.”16 She did however join historian Amy Greenberg in arguing that “amid the
cacophony of options, two were preeminent and competed for dominance.” These terms
are the restrained man, who valued self-control, and the martial man “who rejected the
moral standards of restrained men and proved his manhood through physical
domination.”17
This paper supports those conclusions: while in general masculine ideals divided
along sectional lines, ideals of manhood at this time were more contested among
Americans who lived in the North compared to the South. The terms restrained
manhood and martial manhood are somewhat reductive but still useful categories
supported by primary scholarship. This paper will utilize these terms and argue that an
examination of the presidential contest of 1856 suggests that while Southerners generally
favored martial manhood, in the North there was a split that mostly fell across party lines:
Democrats in the North favored a “restrained manhood” while their Republican
opponents in the North rallied around the ideal of “martial manhood.” In the end though

16
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a majority of eligible voters both North and South preferred a restrained form of
manhood in the White House, and this contributed to James Buchanan’s victory in the
presidential election of 1856.

The Election of 1856

It has been over 160 years since the American presidential election of 1856, and
yet in all that time not a single scholarly monograph has been written on the topic. The
absence of a stand-alone study is surprising. All transfers of power are historic by
definition, but the election of 1856 was especially so. For one, it was the first
presidential contest of the Third Party System (Democrats versus Republicans).18 The
candidates themselves were also historic selections: the Democratic Party’s choice was
former Secretary of State James Buchanan of Pennsylvania, the only lifelong bachelor to
be elected president in American history. For their first-ever presidential nominee the
Republican Party selected famous explorer and former Senator from California, John
Fremont. In addition, former President Millard Fillmore made American history by
running for president again after being out of office for a term. He failed to garner much
support as head of the American Party, a collection of National Whigs and the nativist,

Roy F. Nichols and Philip S. Klein, “Election of 1856: Emergence of the Republican Party” in The
Coming to Power: Critical Presidential Elections in American History, Ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (New
York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1972), 94.
18
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anti-Catholic followers of the Know-Nothing movement, but he arguably played spoiler
in a handful of states.19
The existence of scores of monographs devoted to the following presidential
contest, the election of 1860, are justified by the fact that the result of that campaign led
to secession and the official start of the American Civil War. But the country did not
jump into the Civil War overnight. It was not harmony one day and Fort Sumter the next.
There were already plenty of signs of national fracturing by 1856.
In 1852 the Whig Party, the Democratic Party’s main opposition since the days
of Andrew Jackson, got clobbered at the polls due to an intraparty split over slavery. The
loss proved permanent. Even though they had been one half of the stable two party
system for multiple generations the Whigs never regained national political influence.20
A number of political parties sprouted up to fill the vacuum, mostly at the state level at
first. As these various parties began picking up seats in Congress, especially after the
midterm elections of 1854, the increased number of agendas under separate banners
caused even more dysfunction within the legislative branch. At the start of 1856 the
House of Representatives struggled to complete even the most basic acts of governance
as they entered the second month of “the longest and most contentious Speaker election
in House history.”21 As it prepared for the upcoming presidential election, the American
Party, originally thought to be stronger competition for the Democratic Party than the
new Republican Party, proved unable to avoid the same fate as the Whigs and also split
over slavery (Anti-slavery “North Americans” mostly collaborated with Republicans

Nichols and Klein, “Election of 1856,” 104.
Elbert B. Smith. The Presidency of James Buchanan. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975), 4.
21
History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, “The Longest and Most Contentious Speaker
Election in House History,” https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1851-1900/The-longest-andmost-contentious-Speaker-election-in-its-history/.
19
20
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during the election while the Southerners returned to the Democratic Party).22 Then
President Franklin Pierce sought reelection but was denied his own party’s nomination.
The country was so divided over the current occupant of the White House that the
Democrats believed they had a better chance of holding on to the executive branch by
ditching their current standard bearer and selecting a new man to run on an identical
platform.
Most alarmingly, acts of political violence were on the rise. Just weeks before the
national nominating conventions assembled in June of 1856, Democratic Congressman
Preston Brooks of South Carolina used a cane to beat Republican Senator Charles
Sumner of Massachusetts to the point of unconsciousness on the floor of the United
States Senate. Brooks proudly boasted that the beating was in retaliation for a deliberately
provocative and fiery speech Sumner gave attacking the institution of slavery and those
who supported it.23 During the denunciation Sumner also mocked the speech impediment
that Democratic Senator Andrew Butler had recently developed after suffering a stroke,
and insinuated that the soldiers from South Carolina who fought in the Revolutionary
War had been cowards. In addition to representing South Carolina, Congressman Brooks
was also Andrew Butler’s cousin.24
The speech and then the caning received substantial attention in the partisan press
throughout the election campaign, creating what one historian of the Brooks/Sumner
affair termed “the first national media circus.”25 While notable for its location and the
people involved, the caning did not lead to anyone’s death. The same cannot be said for

Nichols and Klein, “Election of 1856,” 104.
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many of the violent acts that would take place across the Kansas Territory that year. Due
to passage of the contentious Kansas-Nebraska Act, the policy of “popular sovereignty,”
or local control over matters of slavery, had become law. This led to chaos and horrific
acts of violence as armed proslavery and armed antislavery camps flooded into the future
state, eventually creating two distinct territorial governments fighting one another for
legitimacy.26 By January of 1857 over two hundred Americans had been murdered by
their fellow countrymen in Bleeding Kansas.27 War may not have been officially
declared but the violence had already begun.
The presidential election of 1856 happened amidst all of this national discord.
While Buchanan replaced Pierce as President the Democratic Party still remained
in control of the White House. This has no doubt contributed to the relative lack of
scholarly interest in the election. The majority of voters in 1856 chose the status quo
while in 1860 they voted for change, and change elections typically generate more
interest among historians. For the millions of men and women who participated in the
campaign of 1856 though, who produced or read campaign literature, sang campaign
songs at rallies, made passionate speeches at national conventions, and voted in state and
national elections both for the winner and the opposition, the campaign and the election
mattered in their own right, not just as a place holder for a more significant one to come
later. 79% of the white men eligible to vote turned out on election day, the fourth highest
percentage of the electorate to do so in American history. (This is almost as high as the
consequential election of 1860 where 81% of eligible voters went to the polls.)28 When
one views the campaign from the immediacy of the eyes of the participants rather than

Nichols and Klein, “Election of 1856,” 103.
Hoffer, Caning, 67.
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backwards from the critical change election of 1860, the election of 1856 proves itself to
be a topic worthy of further examination by historians.

Rumors of Same-Sex Sexual Behavior

No examination of Buchanan and gender can escape the rumors regarding his
sexual desires and behaviors. Recent popular interest in Buchanan centers around
speculation that he may have been America’s first “gay” president. More specifically, his
intimate relationship with William Rufus King has been the subject of much gossip on
the internet.30 King was a prominent Southern Senator from Alabama who served as
Franklin Pierce’s vice president for six weeks before dying of tuberculosis in 1853. He
was also a lifelong bachelor who lived with Buchanan for many years. What is known
about the relationship these two men shared? How was this relationship received at the
time, before the construction of a homosexual identity? Was it ever weaponized against
Buchanan in the political realm?
A lot of unprovable conclusions have been drawn based upon the living
arrangement of these two nineteenth-century public servants, similar to how rumors about
Abraham Lincoln’s sexual behavior have centered around the fact that he shared a bed
with multiple men.31 This was a common practice during the nineteenth century though,
especially for young traveling lawyers like Lincoln or unmarried men such as Buchanan

A typical example can be read here: Timothy Cwiek, “James Buchanan: America’s First Gay President?”
Washington Blade (October 4th, 2011). http://www.washingtonblade.com/2011/10/04/james-buchananamerica%E2%80%99s-first-gay-president/
31
See C.A. Tripp. The Intimate World of Abraham Lincoln. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).
30
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and King.32 That being said, while many men at the time, even married men, lived
together in boarding houses while in Washington, most of these men tended to live with
fellow members of their own state’s delegations. In fact, many representatives and
senators from Buchanan’s home state of Pennsylvania lived together during the time
Buchanan was in Washington, but Buchanan lived with King instead. A senator from
Pennsylvania and a senator from Alabama living together was far less typical, especially
in the decade before the Civil War. And doing so for fifteen years was less common
still.33
So were King and Buchanan America’s first gay vice-president and president?
Many amateur bloggers argue yes, definitely, but they are not the only ones. Historian
Dr. James Loewen, author of Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American
History Textbook Got Wrong, went so far as to write in 2012 that “There can be no doubt
that James Buchanan was gay, before, during, and after his four years in the White
House. Moreover, the nation knew it too--he was not far into the closet.”34
The choice of words in that statement are problematic for historians of sexuality
because “gay,” “the closet,” and even “homosexual” are anachronistic terms when
discussing antebellum America. As Murphy and others have shown, it was not until the
latter decades of the nineteenth century that categories of identity based around one’s
choice of sexual partners became commonplace. As Jean Baker, the only academic
biographer of Buchanan to address the rumors surrounding his sexuality to date,
explained, “Men in Buchanan’s time did not have sexual identities, although they did
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have sexual behaviors.”35 It is possible that Buchanan engaged in sexual behavior with
other males but it strains credulity to argue that he would have identified as a distinct type
of person because of that behavior. He could not label himself “gay” in 1856 anymore
than he could label himself a “social justice warrior” or a “third-wave feminist.” None of
these terms existed during his lifetime.
Did James Buchanan and William King engage in sexual behavior with each other
then? Dr. Loewen and others who think they did all cite some iteration of the same three
meager pieces of evidence: First, President Andrew Jackson once referred to Buchanan
as “Aunt Nancy.” Second, King had a reputation of being a bit of dandy and was once
called “Aunt Fancy.” Third, a congressman described the two bachelors as “Buchanan
and his wife.”36
These three asides, while intriguing to many, do not provide enough evidence to
draw any scholarly conclusions regarding these men’s sexual practices. Taken together
these comments do make it seem that these men were viewed as somehow defying
gendered expectations, but this could be in reference to their status as bachelors, and/or to
an unusually close platonic friendship between the two bureaucrats, rather than a sincere
public admission that these men engaged in sexual behavior with one another.
Their surviving letters to each other also fail to provide any concrete evidence of a
sexual relationship, although only a fraction of them remain. In a move that does more to
fuel twenty-first century speculations than anything else, the nieces of Buchanan and
King, Harriet Lane and Catherine Ellis, burned the bulk of their uncles’ correspondence
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to one another when Buchanan assumed the presidency.37 One of the most cited
surviving letters by those advocating a sexual relationship is one Buchanan wrote to King
in 1844, during their separation from one another while King served abroad as the
Minister to France. The current Senator from Pennsylvania wrote his absent roommate,
“I am now solitary and alone, having no companion in the house with me. I have gone a
wooing to several gentlemen, but have not succeeded with any one of them.”38 The
assumption of tone is key to understanding the meaning and intention of those words, and
thus many people conclude whatever they would like. While some see a frank admission
of a desire for same-sex sexual companionship, others argue that Buchanan was being
light hearted and humorous with a platonic friend. As statements from the era go it was
far less suggestive than the one from Abraham Lincoln’s grammar tutor (and bedmate),
Billy Greene of New Salem, Illinois, who reportedly shared his view that Lincoln’s
“thighs were as perfect as a human being could be.”39 It is not currently possible to
conclude whether the relationship between these two men had a sexual component.
Regardless, the relationship between Buchanan and King was relevant and
deserves further study. From America’s founding to the election of Abraham Lincoln
political compromises related to slavery helped preserve the union. The 3/5ths clause,
the Missouri Compromise, the Compromise of 1850 and many others became policy not
because of impersonal institutions but because of the actions, views, and relationships of
individual human beings. Buchanan and King were part of the final generation of
compromisers before the start of the Civil War. The political alliance between
Doughfaces, like Buchanan, and Southern Unionists, like King, was key to the
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preservation of the union and the success of the Democratic Party in the Antebellum Era,
including during the election of 1856. Understanding the warm personal relationship
between two party leaders, one from the North and one from the South, can shine a light
on our understanding of how the institution of slavery was accommodated in part due to
the strength of specific relationships. Historians have studied Mary Todd Lincoln’s skills
as a hostess because of the effect they had in helping her husband achieve political goals,
for example, and this is viewed as a valid and important subject of inquiry.40
Understanding the effect William King’s southern roots had on the views and policies of
President Buchanan and his administration is equally valid and important. Historians will
likely continue to disagree about the importance of confirming or disproving the sexual
nature of their relationship, but historians should not dismiss this question of personal
influence, regardless of the sex or gender of the historical actors involved. It is possible
that the intimate relationship between King and Buchanan caused the latter to be more
restrained in his political rhetoric or more eager to seek compromise with Southerners in
general. More research on their relationship and its influence on antebellum politics is
warranted.
This is easier said than done however. Loewen’s second assertion, that the nation
knew Buchanan and King had a sexual relationship, is worth consideration but also
difficult to prove or disprove. In his famous study of same-sex sexual behavior in latenineteenth and early-twentieth century New York City, George Chauncey dismantled
what he termed the myth of invisibility. In Gay New York, Chauncey convincingly argued
that a subculture made up of multiple sexual identities and gender expressions not only
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existed in New York City as early as the 1880s, but it was a world that was highly visible
to outsiders as well.41 The parameters of Chauncey’s findings have been expanded
beyond New York by studies such as Men Like That and Wide Open Town, to name just
two examples.42 If Loewen was correct and there was public awareness of a sexual
relationship between the two senators it would extend Chauncey’s findings on the myth
of invisibility from the 1880s to the Antebellum Era and from New York City all the way
to the White House. Again though, the historical record does not currently provide
sufficient evidence to be able to make that claim with any certainty.
Now, in times of political division and coarseness Americans often like to seek
comfort in the past by imagining it as a more wholesome time than the present. Because
of this many may be led into a false sense of certainty that the personal lives of
candidates, especially surrounding topics of family life and sexuality, would have been
deemed off limits in the public sphere during the 1850s. This argument is proposed by
some who believe Buchanan’s sexual practices could have been common knowledge but
that no one dared mention that behavior publicly due to social codes that have since
fallen away. The election of 1800, when Thomas Jefferson’s sexual relationship with
Sally Hemmings was widely spoken and printed about, and the election of 1828, when
the non-stop reporting surrounding Andrew Jackson’s wife Rachel’s previous marriage
was so caustic that it contributed to her death, are just two examples which show that
belief to be nothing more than wishful thinking.43 Even before the advent of the
homosexual identity, personal and sexual relationships were weaponized in the political
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sphere. 1856 in particular was a year of intense political partisanship. The official
Republican Party platform of 1856 remains the only platform in American history that
resolved to punish the opposition party if put into power.44 If Buchanan’s sexual
behavior was an open secret as Loewen claims, it would be very unusual for his
opponents not to have attempted to use that behavior against him as had been done in
prior American presidential elections and would occur later during the Progressive Era,
as Murphy detailed in Political Manhood.
One claim that can be confidently made is that whatever was known about the two
men and their relationship clearly did not limit their success in attaining impressive
electoral and appointed offices. (Andrew Jackson may have called Buchanan Aunt
Nancy, but he also felt comfortable naming him Minister to Russia.) Nor did it cause
people to be reticent in mentioning the friendship they shared in public, even when
Buchanan was a presidential contender. Based on the historical record, the Democratic
press saw his relationship with William King as something voters would respond to
positively. During the campaign, a frequently reprinted article entitled “Buchanan at
Home” painted a picture of the interior of Wheatland, Buchanan’s estate in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. While describing the estate, the author, Rushmore G. Horton, took time to
note that he “was much gratified in finding in his library a likeness of the late VicePresident King, whom he loved (and who did not?). [Buchanan] declared that [King] was
the purest public man that he ever knew, and that during his intimate acquaintance of

“That all these things have been done with the knowledge, sanction, and procurement of the present
National Administration; and that for this high crime against the Constitution, the Union, and humanity, we
arraign that Administration, the President, his advisers, agents, supporters, apologists, and accessories,
either before or after the fact, before the country and before the world; and that it is our fixed purpose to
bring the actual perpetrators of these atrocious outrages and their accomplices to a sure…punishment
thereafter.”
44
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thirty years he had never known him to perform a selfish act.”45 Horton’s willingness to
stretch the truth in order to praise Buchanan approached the point of absurdity: he
described the candidate’s furniture as “non-ostentatious and democratic” for example.
The author could have ignored the topic of the deceased King altogether. Instead he went
out of his way to highlight and express approval of the two men’s intimate acquaintance
of over 30 years.
The Buchanan/King relationship also received praise at the Democratic National
Convention. After John Breckinridge was selected as the party’s vice-presidential
nominee his description of King as “the intimate and confidential friend of James
Buchanan” was reportedly met with applause by the assembled delegates.46 No one ever
weaponized his relationship with King, even those who never had anything nice to say
about the future fifteenth president.
Nor was it only Buchanan who was well respected in public by his companions.
When King passed away, multiple former colleagues went out on the Senate floor and not
only praised King’s decades of public service but also the example he set for the nation’s
children. Senator Lewis Cass took it even further saying, “In the whole range of
American statesman there are few indeed to whom our youth can better look when
seeking models of imitation and encouragement than to William R. King.”47 Similar
references were repeated multiple times by senators from various regions of the country.
Even when acknowledging the occasion of these remarks, they could have praised his
public accomplishments without celebrating his life as a moral example for the nation’s
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youth. If Dr. Loewen is correct and it was common knowledge that Buchanan and King
participated in a sexual relationship with one another, that would mean their fellow
countrymen and women were much more tolerant of such behavior in the 1850s than has
commonly been believed. Again, there is not conclusive evidence that that is the case.
Even taking all that into account however, historians cannot prove a negative. It
is possible that no one at the time suspected an improper sexual relationship between the
two friends. It is also possible that it was common knowledge that for some reason failed
to make its way into the historical record in a conclusive manner. It could also be
possible that the relationship was romantic but not sexual.
While it is unlikely that Buchanan will ever be able to be called our first “gay”
president with any degree of certainty, what Buchanan’s election can tell those interested
in investigating an atypical White House is that Americans in 1856 were willing to elect a
bachelor, who dearly loved his same-sex companion, to serve as the chief executive.
Lacking a spouse, a status that was definitely public knowledge, clearly did not
disqualify Buchanan from being a potentially effective president in the eyes of the voters:
out of four million total votes he received a half million more than John Fremont, and a
million more votes than former President Millard Fillmore, and both of those men were
married.48 Further, primary sources covering the election demonstrate that concern over
the future of slavery and fears of national disunion played a defining role in the selection
of James Buchanan much more than concern about the marital unions of any of the
candidates.49 When Buchanan’s bachelorhood was mentioned during the presidential
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campaign it was never seen as disqualifying in and of itself, but was used to reinforce
other pre-existing arguments both for and against a Buchanan presidency.

Pro-Buchanan Arguments: The Statesman from Pennsylvania Will Bring Peace

Supporters of Buchanan for president were not particularly effusive with their
praise for the candidate himself. The pro-Buchanan Pittsburg Morning Post described
their state’s favorite son as “the most available and unobjectionable” option, echoing
multiple editorials that praised the former Secretary of State as merely the “safest”,
“soundest”, or “most prudent” choice.50 The Democratic partisan press assured their
readers that the “Old Public Functionary,” as he was widely known, would make an
“able” president.51 Campaign pamphlets barely disguised their lack of enthusiasm with
sincere endorsements such as “Buchanan Will Make No Worse a President Than Franklin
Pierce” and “Every Good Man Should Have His Turn.”52 Henry Wise, the Governor of
Virginia and one of Buchanan’s most prominent surrogates during the campaign, said at a
campaign rally that he was supporting the Democratic Party’s nominee for president
“because it was due to the man.”53 After the Buchanan campaign achieved victory on
November 4, 1856, the brother of an incoming cabinet official praised the president-elect
as “the most suitable man for the times.”54
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If not popular enthusiasm then, what led to Buchanan’s electoral victory in 1856?
Much like Pierson’s argument regarding the influence of gender ideals on the
outbreak of the Civil War, socially constructed gender ideology was not the sole reason
the electorate chose Buchanan, but evidence suggests it was a contributing factor in the
decision. Voters in 1856 did not consider the policy differences between the parties one
day and whether or not the candidates met their definition of ideal manhood on another
day however. As Katz and Bederman argued, manhood was being simultaneously
evaluated from both the personal attributes of the candidates and the policy positions they
held. Therefore, an investigation into the period’s ideals of manhood will be included
alongside more traditional political campaign analysis, more in line with the way the
electorate experienced it.
First, any contemplation of who would be the Democratic Party’s standard bearer
had to include Buchanan simply because no one else at the time came close to matching
his decades of experience on the national and international stage. One biographer has
argued that, with the possible exception of James Madison, “no president had ever come
to the office with more impressive credentials. Nor, to this day, has any matched the
range of Buchanan’s public positions.”55 It is undeniably true that the man who often
ranks as the worst American President of all time was, at least on paper, one of the most
qualified people ever to be nominated for the job.56
A successful lawyer by trade, Buchanan’s public life started at 23 when he
became the youngest member of the Pennsylvania State Assembly. He entered national
politics with a ten-year stint in the U.S. House of Representatives before being plucked
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by Andrew Jackson to serve as the U.S. Minister to Russia. Upon completion of that
high-profile diplomatic position, Buchanan served in the United States Senate from 1834
to 1845, where he wielded substantial influence as chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. In 1845 he joined President Polk’s cabinet as Secretary of State
during a period that saw the annexation of Texas, war with Mexico, and a boundary
dispute with Great Britain over the Oregon territory. Buchanan was twice offered a seat
on the United States Supreme Court from two different Presidents (he turned down both
offers in order to pursue the presidency) as well as an offer to come out of “retirement” to
serve as Minister to England during President Pierce’s tenure (which he did accept). In
addition, he was a serious contender for the Democratic Party’s nomination in 1844 and
1848, and in 1852 had led the voting on 34 ballots before, at the urging of Buchanan’s
people, the deadlocked convention began throwing his support over to Pierce.57
Buchanan’s experience received frequent mention during the Democratic
National Convention when the time came to select a candidate for President. Unlike
conventions today where the nominee has often been unofficially selected months in
advance, in 1856 the nominee was truly selected at the convention. Multiple speakers at
the party’s nominating convention in Cincinnati mentioned Buchanan’s “most enlarged
experience” and “preeminent qualifications” when attempting to persuade others to back
the former Pennsylvania senator as their nominee. Supporters frequently stressed
Buchanan’s “many years of patriotic service.” John Breckenridge, the Democratic Party’s
nominee for vice president, endorsed his running mate by referring to him as “the tried
statesman of Pennsylvania.”58
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At least equally important to Buchanan’s selection by the Democratic Party
because he was a tried statesman of Pennsylvania was the fact that he was a tried
statesman of Pennsylvania. Political operatives from both parties recognized
Pennsylvania as the defining contest of the 1856 presidential election due to its twentyseven electoral votes.59
The Republican opposition met shortly after James Buchanan secured his
nomination at the Democratic National Convention, and they highlighted the importance
of the Keystone State to the outcome of the election even more than the Democrats had.
One of the clearest admissions of the importance of Pennsylvania in the election of 1856
was the location the Republicans picked for their party’s first ever presidential
nominating convention: Philadelphia. While this was a fitting symbolic choice for the
burgeoning party, laying the groundwork for a victory in Pennsylvania also made
practical electoral sense.60
Although they had made exceptional gains in state offices in the two years since
the party had formed, Republicans were in fact a sectional party at this time and knew
they would earn few if any electoral votes from Southern states. (This turned out to be an
accurate assessment: forget about states, Fremont carried zero counties south of the
Mason-Dixon line.)61
This sectional party had many advantages in the presidential contest of 1856,
however. For one the population of the Northern states overwhelmed the Southern states
by a ratio of 2:1. This gave the states in the North higher numbers of presidential electors
on average than in the South. At this time the state of Texas only contributed half the
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electoral votes that the state of Maine did, for example. The largest electoral prizes of the
South were South Carolina and Georgia, with only ten votes a piece in the Electoral
College.62 The Republicans were right to believe that if they could claim a few border
states they could have won the election without carrying a single Southern state, or more
likely, they would have thrown the election to the House of Representatives by keeping
Buchanan from winning an electoral college majority.
Buchanan himself now headed a party that, for all the Democratic claims of being
the only remaining national party, was also becoming increasingly sectional. There were
296 votes in the Electoral College at this time, meaning 149 electoral votes would win the
presidency. Both parties believed that about seventy of those votes were up for grabs,
especially in states such as Pennsylvania (27 votes), Indiana (13), and Illinois (11). New
York, the largest electoral prize in the country (35), was deemed safely in Republican
hands. 63 If Republicans won the second largest prize, Pennsylvania, and nine other votes
from any swing state, they could have won the White House on their first attempt. By
nominating native Pennsylvanian and favorite son James Buchanan as their nominee
however, the Democrats purposely made the largest toss-up electoral prize in the country
more likely to fall into their column.
In addition to location, the Republican National Committee’s choice of timing for
their convention also exposed their belief that Pennsylvania was going to be the site of a
crucial and competitive campaign. The national committee chose to hold their
convention so it overlapped with the Republican Party’s Pennsylvania State Convention,
also happening in Philadelphia, allowing the state and national campaign workers to
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better coordinate their efforts.64 Having finished up their work at the state convention,
the members walked over to the national convention and asked to be admitted. When the
chair of the national convention turned this request over to the delegates, a representative
from the New Hampshire delegation replied that they were willing to give up their seats
for the Pennsylvania delegates, or even “hold those who wish to be admitted in our laps
rather than they should be excluded.”65
Later, when the Know Nothing Party sent a message to the convention showing
their support however, it sparked two days of debate on whether or not the notice should
even be acknowledged.66 Clearly not everyone was automatically welcomed in; the
inclusion of the state delegates was a strategic move. In fact, for some delegates hesitancy
to acknowledge the Know Nothings came from a fear of alienating the large number of
German-Americans living in states like Pennsylvania. Towards the end of the convention
they had just such a person, a German-born American citizen, address the crowd to push
back against their fears about losing Pennsylvania due to the German vote. This man
reassured the crowd, saying, “I love Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania was the first to take me
to her arms…I am sorry to hear any one even doubt of the certainty of Pennsylvania for
freedom in the coming election.”67
Further, Pennsylvania proved to be on the minds of the Republican delegates not
just when discussing whom they wanted to include at their convention, but also when
they were choosing who was going to oppose Buchanan in the general election. Fremont
was the likely favorite, but there were other contenders. Salmon Chase had successfully
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united a coalition of Republicans, former Whigs, and Know Nothings to win the
governorship of Ohio and hoped to ride a similar fusion ticket to the White House. He
inspired little popular enthusiasm, however, and had few friends among the new party’s
leadership. William Seward of New York was likely the strongest anti-slavery politician
at the convention, but he was deemed a risky choice for some delegates due to his
previous disavowal of the Know Nothings. Additionally, Seward’s friends advised he
wait until 1860 when, they believed, the chance for a Republican win was more likely.
Also in the mix was the moderate Judge John McLean of Ohio, the favorite of the
Pennsylvania delegation.68
The centrality of Pennsylvania to the outcome of the election was addressed in
multiple nominating speeches. A New York delegate in favor of Seward urged everyone
to compromise on a candidate who could win. After praising Seward as “the best
representative of our principles” he declared, “because we are told that he cannot carry
Pennsylvania, we at once sacrifice him upon the body of the opposition (cheers).”69
Upon realizing that McLean did not have substantial support at the convention compared
to Fremont, his spokesperson, Judge Rufus Spaulding, read a letter written by McLean
withdrawing his name from consideration. Following this announcement, a delegate
from Pennsylvania asked to address the crowd. He lamented that “the only name which
could have saved Pennsylvania had been withdrawn” and although he would vote for
whatever ticket the party settled on, he “feared that as a consequence they would lose
Pennsylvania by 50,000 votes.” According to the official proceeding printed by the
Republican National Committee this was met with loud boos and groaning, indicating
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that the crowd understood the stakes inherit in losing Pennsylvania’s electoral votes.70 A
New York delegate took the stage and tried to give time for everyone to reassess now that
the most likely candidate to please the Pennsylvanians had removed himself from
consideration. He proposed that “for the purpose of giving time for consultation—
especially with the Pennsylvanians—I move that the convention take a recess until five o’
clock this afternoon.” The New York delegates’ proposal was approved. The business of
nominating a president was put on hold due to the importance of the Pennsylvania
delegation.
When the group reassembled at five that evening there was dramatic news:
McLean had withdrawn his concession. Apparently enough people had been scared by
the threat of losing Pennsylvania’s electoral votes to reconsider his nomination. Then the
voting began. Fremont carried the majority of the votes on the first ballot, earning 359
votes to Mclean’s 190. The nomination now seemed destined to be Fremont’s: the
candidate with the next highest tally after Mclean was Charles Sumner with 2 votes, and
that was mostly a symbolic show of support for the Senator who had been beaten with a
cane on the Senate floor by Preston Brooks a few weeks earlier. A new round of voting
started in an attempt to give Fremont a unanimous vote of approval from the convention.
Every state but two cast all of their votes for Fremont: Ohio and Pennsylvania. McLean’s
home state of Ohio gave him 14 of their 69 votes with the rest going to Fremont. In a
more concerning turn, Pennsylvania gave nearly a third of their votes to McLean.71 As a
consolation, the convention catered to the wishes of the Pennsylvanians one more time by
nominating McLean’s choice, young William Dayton of New Jersey, for Vice President.
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As the Republican National Convention came to a close, both parties had
demonstrated the centrality of Pennsylvania to the upcoming national contest.
Buchanan’s status as a native son of Pennsylvania contributed significantly to his
selection as the Democratic nominee.
A third key factor in Buchanan winning the election of 1856 was his absence
during the recent controversies surrounding the extension of slavery in the United States.
As Minister to England Buchanan served abroad from 1853 to 1856, conveniently absent
when the passage of the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act divided the nation. This act called
for local control over the status of slavery, allowing for the possible extension of slavery
not just in the new territory out west but also in places north of the Mason Dixon line
where the peculiar institution had previously been banned by law. The Republican Party
made opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act a central tenet of their party, and by doing
so achieved impressive electoral wins during the midterm elections of 1854, winning
elections in all but four states and causing Democrats to lose control of the House of
Representatives.72 Due to his administration’s support of the divisive legislation, worried
Democrats refused to re-nominate President Franklin Pierce for a second term, fearing he
was too unpopular to win reelection. Buchanan’s other main competition for the
nomination, Illinois’ Stephen Douglas, had written and introduced the bill into the
Senate, and thus was also too tied up in the recent controversies to gain the support of
two-thirds of the delegates at the Democratic National Convention either, particularly due
to holdouts from the North.73
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In fact, when the Pittsburg Morning Post praised Buchanan for being
“unobjectionable” they argued he was unobjectionable specifically because he had not
been around for “many of the recent disturbing issues.”74 The Pittsfield Sun supported his
nomination as well because he was “not mixed up with the modern strifes.”75 A
campaign pamphlet celebrated that Buchanan’s service abroad “presented the advantage
of being more recently out of the fierce conflicts which the Democracy has waged against
a dangerous and powerful faction.”76 All Buchanan’s major biographers agree that not
having been at the center of the previous years’ political fights played a decisive role in
his selection as the party’s standard bearer.77
Buchanan’s personality and temperament were also commented on by many as a
reason he was the right man for the times. In a campaign speech on June 13th Virginia
Governor Henry Wise argued that “to settle this sectional strife, no man could bring so
much Northern strength to unite with the South in defense of the Constitution and the
Union as James Buchanan has brought and can bring.” Buchanan would unite the
country and settle the sectional strife that was already a national reality in 1856. Part of
this was due to his policy positions. Since Buchanan supported popular sovereignty just
as his predecessor Franklin Pierce did, Wise predicted that if Buchanan won the election
“then we may regard the doctrine and the practice as settled and sanctioned, and the
South may feel safe, and the North be content to abide by the Constitution as it is.” But
Wise continued, saying that Buchanan himself “had healing in his wings…to compose
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these strifes.”78 Buchanan would “settle sectional strife” by uniting Americans through
policy positions, but also because of the type of man that he was.
Buchanan’s personal temperament, as described by Wise and others, fits the
definition of Amy Greenberg’s “restrained manhood,” particularly as it relates to restraint
and self-control. Greenberg described a “restrained man” as someone who exhibited
“self-restraint and moral self-discipline” in contrast to someone who glorified “physical,
often bloody cultural expressions.”79 In other words, a “restrained man” was someone
who had the self-control to resist getting into a fight.
In his campaign speech, Wise called Buchanan “civil in every sense,” and as a
“civilian and statesman of experience,” Wise noted approvingly that Buchanan had
always been both “prudent” and “cautious.” Wise returned to this theme later in the
speech when he argued that Buchanan’s “soft, winning, gentle, forbearing” nature
enforced his belief that “he is the man to turn away wrath.” Another prominent Democrat
who supported Buchanan for president, Senator Thomas Hart Benton, similarly described
Buchanan as “never a leading man in any high sense, but eminently a man of peace.”80
Over and over again Democrats in the north praised Buchanan in similar language
to that used by Wise and Benton. The Erie Observer argued Buchanan would make a
great choice because he was a “wise and cautious statesman.”81 A lengthy pro-Buchanan
campaign pamphlet distributed in the North spent a lot of space depicting their nominee
as fitting the ideal of a self-restrained man. After describing the democratic nominee’s
childhood in Pennsylvania, the author explicitly noted, “Here in the humble home
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[Buchanan] first learned the lessons of self-control.” Later Buchanan received praise for
his “mild and impressive manners” and his “great tact and sagacity.” The future
president himself was quoted extensively during the campaign advocating for a restrained
type of manhood for the country: “Would to Heaven that the spirit of mutual forbearance
and brotherly love, which presided at [America’s] birth, could once more be restored to
bless the land!”82 Lastly, the pamphlet went even further by celebrating the fact that
Buchanan had endured a lifetime in politics without “souring a disposition which is
feminine in its delicacy, its gentle courtesy, its patient kindliness” before arguing that
“James Buchanan is the man for the times.” Being delicate, courteous, and kind to the
point of seeming feminine was something that Buchanan backers expressed as necessary
for the next male leader of the nation.
Calls for restraint were being made in reaction to the rise in political violence.
Benton voiced the fears of many Americans in 1856 when he said, “We are treading upon
a volcano that is liable at any moment to burst forth and overwhelm the nation.”83 Within
a climate of growing tension, where even prominent senior politicians were voicing fears
that events might quickly erupt and create an unprecedented national crisis, a man with a
personality who could “turn away wrath” was seen as desirable in a President. Even if not
viewed as a “leading man”, Buchanan’s supporters championed a “soft and forebearing”
type of man who would not fight, but thanks to his restrained temperament, bring peace
to a divided nation.
When viewed from this context, the newspaper endorsements that called him the
“safest”, “soundest”, and “most prudent” choice for president now seem meant to be
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higher praise than might be initially assumed. Just as Pierson demonstrated that Fremont
and his supporters “tried to exploit the gender beliefs of their constituents” in order to
win the White House, Buchanan and his supporters were engaged in the same activity,
just with a different image of the ideal man. And, as Pierson also argued in Free Hearts
and Free Homes, while this depiction of Buchanan as an ideal example of restrained,
even feminine, manhood was not the sole cause of the election’s outcome, primary
research indicates that it was one of the contributing factors at play.
Now, while enough voters believed Buchanan was the right man for the times to
hand him the presidency, there were also millions of Americans who hoped someone else
would win the election.

Anti-Buchanan Arguments: A Spectrum of Martial Manhood

While Buchanan’s distance from the political controversies that occurred in the
years preceding the election of 1856 made him an attractive candidate to Northern
Democrats, that distance caused southern delegates at the Democratic National
Convention to prefer other men to lead their party. Further, these preferences and the
language they used to contrast Buchanan and his Democratic rivals reveals competing
definitions of manhood between Northern and Southern delegates within the same party.
The hope that Buchanan could be a unifying figure helped him gain the most
votes on the first ballot, thirteen more than the sitting president and over one hundred
more than Senator Stephen Douglas.84 When it became clear after subsequent balloting
that Pierce would not be able to win the requisite support the majority of Pierce’s
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supporters switched over to Douglas. It took seventeen ballots for Buchanan to clinch the
nomination, mostly due to Pierce and Douglas holdouts from states in the deep South.85
Buchanan’s reputation as a friend to Southern interests and defender of the institution of
slavery was well established. It is understandable that in the climate of the 1856 election
some in the South might not trust a northern candidate’s loyalty to their interests
regardless of their record, but these same people had no problem backing New
Hampshire’s Pierce and Illinois’ Douglas. So why did Southern delegates prefer Pierce
and Douglas if there was essentially no difference in where the candidates stood on the
issues?
The answer appears to be the reverse of why so many Northern delegates thought
he was the right choice: because Pierce and Douglas had been at the forefront of the
political fights of the last few years. Southern delegates saw them as fighters, and that is
what they wanted. Once Douglas withdrew and it became clear that Buchanan was going
to win the nomination, each state that had backed other candidates switched their vote
over to Buchanan so he would receive unanimous support from the convention. A
delegate from North Carolina explained his delegation’s previous votes against Buchanan
in language that would be echoed by many other state delegations. He explained that
their support for Pierce was in appreciation for the “bold and manly stand taken by his
administration in…upholding the rights of all the states in this union.”86 They then had
switched over to Douglas out of “high appreciation of the eminent services rendered to
his country” by the “gallant leader” of the Kansas and Nebraska Bill.”87 While they now
fully supported James Buchanan as the nominee they had voted differently earlier
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because “pending his stay in Europe events transpired which identified Messrs. Pierce
and Douglas more prominently than others with certain leading issues before the country,
and we respect their services in that…”88
What catches one’s eye when searching the record for historic ideals of manhood
is the way the three men are consistently described in similar language in all of these
explanatory statements. Georgia also praised Douglas for how he “manfully battled for
great constitutional and conservative principles” but when they turned their focus to the
nominee all they could muster was to reassure those present that they had “a warm and
cordial Southern heart for James Buchanan.”89
Missouri explained how Douglas had “endeared himself to the state of Missouri
and the whole country in manfully standing up for all the great principles of the
Constitution…and the moral heroism with which he has constantly met and vanquished
the enemies of our peace, and the enemies of our Union, but since he has directed his
friends to withdraw his name…” they would now support “a statesman of the greatest
talents and ability.” They continued by cheering Buchanan’s “ability and sagacity as a
diplomatist.”90
State after state drew a contrast between the two contenders for the nomination
who had participated in “manly battle” and the skills or “abilities” of a great “statesman.”
According to the words chosen to describe the candidates there was a nearly unanimous
consensus among the Southern delegates of the Democratic National Convention that
there was a difference between being “manly” like Pierce and Douglas, a designation that
appears to be aligned with taking action and defeating enemies, and being a restrained

88

Parkhurst, Democrat National Convention, 50.
Parkhurst, Democrat National Convention, 52.
90
Parkhurst, Democrat National Convention, 54.
89

37

statesman like Buchanan who could adequately preside over the nation’s affairs as a
peaceful Chief Magistrate. The language used repeatedly connected the ideal of manhood
to people who embraced conflict. Men were not afraid to stand up and fight others.
Rather than being restrained like a statesman and seek civil compromise, men “do battle”
for what they believe in.
Southern Democrats preferred men like Douglas and Pierce who were closer to
their ideal of a combative, or martial, masculinity. In reality all three of the top
contenders for the Democratic nomination were Northern statesmen who better fit Amy
Greenberg’s definition of restrained manhood—none of them committed acts of physical
domination against their political opponents. Categories of gender are never absolute
however, and although they did not literally commit acts of violence they were still
viewed as fighters. Rather than view masculine ideals as distinct, rigid categories, a
spectrum may be more useful here. On one end were reserved diplomats like Buchanan,
peaceful and full of tact, but missing in action. Fiery and combative politicians like
Douglas and Pierce were still reserved but exhibited more martial manhood than
Buchanan by dominating others politically and winning contentious legislative battles.
Men like Preston Brooks, a man who famously committed an actual act of physical
domination, more strongly exemplified the ideal of martial manhood. While Brooks did
not compete with Buchanan for the nomination, his centrality to a national debate about
ideal manhood during the heat of the campaign makes him an illuminating subject of
inquiry when considering views on gender in the election of 1856.
Much has been written about the Brooks/Sumner caning, but there has been little
focus on how this affair impacted the 1856 presidential election specifically. Most
secondary literature either explores one topic or the other, as if they had little to do with
38

one another. One biographer does note it occurred close to the nomination of Buchanan
but does not elaborate.91
Evidence suggests that the caning inflamed passions across the nation though, and
more specifically it served as a focal point for Republicans at campaign rallies throughout
the general election.
Republican rallies were known for their boisterousness. According to historian
Philip Klein, Republicans at this time were much younger on average than members of
the Democratic Party, and mostly made up of individuals seeking to overthrow the status
quo. He described Republicans as “young reformers and dedicated crusaders, a group
which was, in contrast to others…committed, enthusiastic, passionate, optimistic,
uncompromising, and imbued with a sense of religious mission.”92 Perhaps it is
unsurprising then that Republican rallies were loud and emotional events, with lots of
marching, singing, and public processions. Republican campaign songs sought to excite
passion among the young people turning out at the rallies.93 The inclusion of Brooks in
multiple Republican campaign songs is evidence that Brooks and his actions stirred
passions across the country during the election of 1856, while simultaneously providing
further evidence of how ideals of manhood differed across the country. Many antiBuchanan songs have verses that also reference Brooks with lyrics such as “And with
them we’ll beat old Buchan!/ Yes, rout the whole gang, from Douglas to Brooks/Who’d
subdue us with canes…” or this one sung to the tune of Auld Lange Syne: “The South
may send her champions out/Her cowards armed with canes/The freemen of the North
fear not/Her tyrants or her chains.”94
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Beyond these references however there were also multiple songs exclusively
devoted to the topic of Preston Brooks. One song that went to the tune of a popular
campaign song from a previous presidential campaign (“Tippecanoe and Tyler Too”)
asked “Have you heard of P.S. Brooks, Brooks, Brooks/With his gutta percha cane?/For
he struck a blow, laid our champion low/But it roused the nation for once and again/And
it’ll take a mighty big cane, cane cane/Slavery’s cause to gain.” Another song labeled
him “Bully Brooks” and condemned how “He thoroughly had learned the knack/Of
welting Sambo’s tawny back…/ But tiring of this pleasant game/And bent on varying the
same/He form’d a safe and easy plan/To flog a harmless Free-State man…”95 These
songs were not sung in South Carolina, the only state Preston Brooks was on the ballot.96
They were sung in the North during political rallies for the presidential campaign.
Besides Fremont and Buchanan no other man had as many campaign songs devoted
entirely to them, including the candidate for the American Party, former President
Millard Fillmore. The inclusion of Brooks and this incident of physical domination in so
many of these songs supports the conclusion that the caning was an influential element of
the 1856 presidential contest.
In his monograph on the cane attack, historian William Hoffer detailed how
responses to the affair were not just seen at campaign rallies, but they dominated the
partisan press as well. He termed it “the first national media circus” and noted that the
coverage remained constant from the day after the attack on May 22, 1856, all the way
through the election in November.97 Responses, Hoffer found, were sharply divided by
region. Through his research of newspapers in 1856 he found that “editorials in the
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North and border states agreed that the attack was ‘brutal,’ inappropriate in its location,
and improper. Northern language was more condemnatory of Brooks as a ‘brute’ and
exculpatory of Sumner’s use of language in the ‘Crime against Kansas” speech.
Democratic commentaries tended to focus more on what Sumner had done to provoke
it.”98
An examination of newspapers does indeed show that trend. One Northern
newspaper editorialized that “the spirit of ruffianism exhibited by Brooks cannot be too
highly censured” while another mocked Brooks, claiming that “brute force was resorted
to, to accomplish by the blows of a club what they could not do by the power of
intellect.”99 The use of physical dominance made Brooks a ruffian, comparable to the
unmannered men pouring into Kansas and causing unlawful violence, men commonly
referred to at the time as “border ruffians.”100 According to commentators in the North
Brooks was not an ideal man because of his successful dominance of another person. In
fact, resorting to violence made him something less than a man; it made him a brute.
Brooks’ manhood was challenged by a Boston paper one day after the attack:
“The member from South Carolina transgressed every rule of honor which should
animate or restrain one gentleman in his connections with another in his ruffian assault
upon Mr. Sumner. There is no chivalry in a brute. There is no manliness in a
scoundrel.”101 A man’s honor was tied to how restrained he could be. Failing to restrain
himself from committing an act of violence made him less than a man, it made him a
brute.
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In contrast, Southern Democrats, much as they honored Pierce and Douglas for
their willingness to fight rhetorically and legislatively for policy positions, also praised
Brooks for his willingness to resort to a physical method of control. After it was reported
that Brooks had broken his cane during the assault, Southern supporters sent dozens of
canes to the Congressman, some with inscriptions such as “Hit him again” and “knockdown arguments.”102 Editorials maintained that it was Sumner in fact who failed to meet
a masculine ideal by, in a widely reprinted phrase, “bellowing like a calf” after he had
been struck down.103 Not only could he not adequately defend himself in a fight, these
Southerners argued, but also he was as pathetic as a weak animal being slaughtered once
the blows had been struck. Similar to the use of the word “brute” to imply that Brooks
was somehow less than a full man, the frequent comparisons of Sumner to a calf sought
to depict him as failing to meet the requirements of ideal manhood. Some papers went
further and mocked the perceived delicate sensitivities of Northern Republican men in
general, as well as accusing Sumner of faking the extent of his injuries for sympathy. A
paper out of Richmond, Virginia was perhaps the bluntest when it wrote, “Fanatics of the
male gender, and weak-minded woman and silly children, are horribly affected at the
thought of blood oozing out from a pin scratch. And Sumner is wily politician enough to
take advantage of this little fact.”104 Men who could get upset over the sight of blood
were categorized with the women and children, and this time associations with femininity
were not was viewed as admirable. According to what was written in Southern
newspapers, a real man was a fighter who was not afraid of spilt blood.
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The solid support Brooks had throughout the South supports Foote’s conclusion
that “martial manhood” was an ideal broadly held throughout the South at this time. But
what about the doughfaces, the Southern-sympathizing Northern Democrats from states
like Pennsylvania who proved crucial to Buchanan’s victory in 1856? How did they react
to this caning?
Consistent with the ideals they held up in praise of Buchanan, Northern
Democrats mostly called for restraint in the aftermath of the caning. They did not praise
Brooks for his attack but they also thought Sumner had been indelicate in his speech and
thus provoked Brooks. Their argument was neither man had conducted himself well.
The New York Tribune reported that Buchanan himself viewed the incident this way.
After a Northern man from Illinois, W.W. Sterling, gave a speech condemning “the
attack of Canine Brooks upon the noble Sumner for defending freedom,” he found
himself sitting next to the current Democratic nominee. The reporter for the Tribune
claimed he overheard Buchanan disagreeing with Sterling’s framing of the caning. While
he agreed that “Mr. Brooks was indelicate” he lectured Sterling, saying, “My young
friend, you only look upon the dark side of the picture. Mr. Sumner’s speech was the
most vulgar tirade of abuse ever delivered in a deliberative body.”105 The statesman did
not care for the violence, but he also felt the need to condemn the lack of tact exhibited
by the senator from Massachusetts. While the validity of this source relies on the honesty
of the reporter, no one from the Buchanan camp ever disavowed this statement. Doing so
would have been politically unwise since the majority of Northern Democrats appeared to
agree with this assessment. Also, both sides being to blame helped make the argument
that a peaceful candidate like Buchanan was the right man for the times. Both Brooks and
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Sumner were unable to show the restraint necessary to keep their passions from leading
to violent conflict. Unlike Buchanan, these men lacked the ability to turn away wrath.
While most Southern Democrats viewed Brooks an ideal man, for Northern Democrats
the caning affair highlighted the need for a man of peace like Buchanan to preside over
the country.
Intriguingly, while Republican newspapers focused on how “unmanly” Brook’s
actions were, there was an electrifying moment at the Republican National Convention
that depicted respect for the ideal of “martial manhood.” In a moment not mentioned in
the secondary literature, one speech demonstrated that celebrations of violence were not
strictly limited to those who lived in the South. At the Republican National Convention,
a speaker elicited some of the most intense cheering of the entire proceedings when
giving a passionate response to reported threats made by Southern congressmen against
their Northern colleagues should they vote to expel Brooks from the House of
Representatives for his caning of Sumner. While lengthy, the excerpt below deserves to
be quoted in full due to how forcefully it contradicts the notion that martial manhood was
strictly a southern ideal:
I see by telegraphic dispatches from Washington that the announcement is
made when that question comes up in the House the Southern gentlemen
are to make threats and perhaps to execute them. [Shouts of let them
dare.] Gentlemen, I believe that the men who represent you have made up
their minds. [Vociferous cheers/cries of Good! Bravo!] I believe they
have made up their minds to go where duty requires them to go, vote as
duty requires them to vote; and I believe they have made up their minds to
defend their persons and their lives whenever [tremendous and long
cheering] whenever, wherever, however, by whomsoever assailed [great
cheering]. No gentlemen, threats will not silence the freemen of the North.
We know we have behind us fifteen millions of freemen [cheers]—we
know that if we fail in the exercise of our constitutional duties, and in
defense of our constitutional rights, that gallant and true men all over the
North will step into our places, and fill them better than we can do. [loud
cheers] Gentlemen, trouble yourselves with no anxiety about affairs in
Washington. We will take care of ourselves [thundering cheers] We want
44

to have it known all over the land that the representatives of the Northern
freemen are ready to take care of themselves in the performance of their
duty [cheers]. But while we make that resolution and adhere to it, in
God’s name, gentlemen of the North, resolve to do your duty and to blot
out the Slave Power of the country [cheers].106

No calls for preservation of the union or restraint were uttered in this well received
speech, but instead a call was made at a national convention made up of Northern
delegates, not just to defeat their opponents politically, but to “blot the slave power out of
the country” entirely. Unlike the restrained Buchanan, who would fail to do his duty and
stand up to the slave power, these Northern freemen were not going to be controlled by
threats, but instead were going to speak their mind, vote, and even fight if necessary.
A promotion of “martial manhood” also occurred during the nomination of
potential Republican candidates for vice-president, but the tone was more humorous.
While the eventual pick would be William Dayton, there was substantial interest in a
former congressman named Abraham Lincoln. The delegate from Lincoln’s adopted
state of Illinois praised the future president’s physical vigor by describing him as being in
“the prime of his life—about fifty-five years of age—and enjoying remarkably good
health.” While he was actually 47 at the time of the convention, he was in good health, a
legitimate issue when considering whom to pick as a vice-president. It shifted
unquestionably into the territory of “martial manhood” when Judge Spaulding called out
to the speaker, “Can he fight?” Lincoln’s nominator shouted back, “Yes! Have I not told
you he was born in Kentucky? [Applause.] He’s strong mentally, he’s strong physically,
he’s strong in every way.”107
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These celebrations of “martial manhood” at the Republican National Convention
fit in with Foote’s research into ideals of manhood within the Union Army during the
official Civil War. A key aspect of the Republican speaker’s willingness to commit
violence is that it would be done “to defend their persons and their lives.”108 In her
monograph Foote disproves what she calls a “common misconception among scholars
who study manhood in the nineteenth century,” namely historians who tend to
“emphasize the contrast between self-controlled northern manhood and passionate
southern manhood.”109 She found that Northern men justified passionate outbursts of
physical dominance if the person was defending himself or if an aggressor interfered with
their ability to perform their official duties. This overlooked moment at the Republican
National Convention, along with campaign songs that condemn “Bully Brooks” for his
act of physical dominance while simultaneously promising to “rout the whole gang” in
return, shows that some support for “martial manhood” was present in the Northern states
at least half a decade before the war as well. While conceptions of manhood were
broadly sectional, closer scrutiny reveals that there were some shared ideals between
North and South. Northern Democrats on the whole still favored restraint, and their
candidate won the election of 1856. With “martial manhood” being cheered on by both
Republicans and the majority of Democrats, however, perhaps it was already too late to
contain the violence for long, even with a peacemaker as president.

Anti-Buchanan Arguments II: A Lack of Manly Independence
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While Buchanan’s failure to adequately perform “martial manhood” actually
helped him win the Democratic nomination, it also made him less attractive as a
presidential contender to many Americans, particularly in the South, who wanted a
fighter in the White House. This was not the only way Buchanan was seen as not
achieving ideal manhood however. During the campaign the future president was
consistently attacked by Republicans in the North through convention speeches,
campaign songs, and political cartoons for lacking what can be termed manly
independence.
The first Republican National Convention met in Philadelphia in June of 1856,
eleven days after the Democratic party nominated Buchanan and less than a month after
the caning of Charles Sumner. The first mention of Buchanan at the convention
contrasted his private character and his policy positions. The President of the RNC,
Robert Emmet of New York, had been a lifelong Democrat who recently joined the
Republican Party in response to passage of the Kansas/Nebraska Act. Emmet admitted to
the assembled crowd that “I have known honorable James Buchanan for forty years and
upwards, intimately” even going so far as to say that “some of the dearest and most
cherished recollections of my life are connected with my associations with him.”110 The
speaker maintained that he “would defend [Buchanan’s] personal character if assailed”
and was only motivated by objections to “his political character—if I were not in deadly
hostility to that, I would not be here.”111
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Objections to Buchanan’s personal character were expressed at the Republican
National Convention however. Additionally, the policy positions that the convention
President objected to were used to define and then condemn the type of man Buchanan
supposedly was. When examined together these statements reveal a pattern that is
helpful in further understanding ideals of manhood in the lead-up to the Civil War.
Emmet continued speaking. At first, he did in fact keep his comments focused on
policy: Buchanan had been a staunch advocate for the Missouri Compromise as late as
1848, but by 1850 abandoned that stance in support of the Compromise of 1850 which
rendered the previous compromise null and void. However, the condemnation of
Buchanan’s policy change soon took on a personal character. Emmet accused “the
honorable James Buchanan of having shown a want of firmness, a want of self-reliance, a
want of adhesion of principle, and an over-zealous devotion to party in several aspects of
his life.”112 Much like the Southern delegates at the Democratic National Convention,
the speaker did not see Buchanan as someone willing to do battle for core principles.
Instead of being firm in his beliefs, he was soft. Instead of being guided by principle he
was over-zealous, or over-emotional, in devotion to his party.
Buchanan opened himself up to this attack with one of the only public statements
he issued during the entire campaign. Following the protocol of the time, delegates from
the convention traveled to their nominee’s home in Lancaster, Pennsylvania to formally
announce that he had been selected as their candidate for President. In response
Buchanan released a public statement where he fully endorsed the platform that came out
of the convention in Cincinnati. He went even further by saying “I have been placed
upon a platform of which I most heartily approve, and that can speak for me. Being the
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representative of the great Democratic Party, and not simply James Buchanan, I must
square my own conduct according to the platform of that party, and insert no new plank,
nor take one from it.”113 This was likely a statement meant to reassure his tepid Southern
supporters in the Democratic Party. It proved to be a winning strategy for at least some of
these men. Preston Brooks admitted, "Mr. Buchanan was neither my first nor second
choice for the Presidency,” but because he unequivocally endorsed the Cincinnati
platform without reservation, Brooks supported him, explaining that he “could not be
unfaithful to the man without treachery to the principles he represents.”114
This stance did not escape condemnation however. While no Republican at the
convention mentioned Buchanan’s bachelor status, his lack of independence was the
chief attack made against him by numerous state delegations. One speaker personally
denigrated the Democratic nominee for:
acknowledging that he is no longer James Buchanan, a free agent, with the
right of expressing whatever will or opinion he may have of his own; but
that he is bound to that platform, and to every plank of it, and that he has
no right or power to remove or alter one plank of it—an admission that he
has allowed himself to be chained to the Juggernaut of Slavery, and he
allows himself to be dragged headlong by it. [Loud Cheers.] I make all
allowance, fellow citizens, for the impossibility of a man in this country,
who is a politician, who is a party man, of his having his own will, and
carrying it out in all respects. It is, I allow, impossible.”115

By portraying a party man as someone who by definition lacked the independence
necessary to achieve ideal manhood, this speaker turned the “statesman” label meant as a
compliment by Buchanan’s Democratic Party colleagues into an insult. The implicit
statement is that Fremont’s lack of political experience, which could be viewed as a
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liability in a presidential contest, actually made him an independent man unencumbered
by any interests, particularly the interests of party and of slaveholders.
Attacks on Buchanan’s independence continued throughout the convention. A
third delegate denigrated Buchanan for “being willing to humiliate himself in the dust
before the cart of slavery, and to consent to be made the instrument of perpetuating and
extending its rule.”116 The metaphor of an animal pulling a cart implied that Buchanan is
no man but a beast of burden being used in service of the slave power. The Republican
delegates from Pennsylvania knocked his lack of manly independence while again
arguing he was only chosen as the nominee because of electoral math. “But the slave
power wanted a tool,” the Pennsylvania delegate said, “it wanted the vote of a northern
state, and it cast its eye to Pennsylvania and James Buchanan.”117 Again, Buchanan is
less than a man, nothing but a mere instrument or tool. The Democratic Party’s
nominee’s manhood was called into question because his positions revealed him to be too
dependent and submissive to others.
Nor was it only at the conventions that this argument against Buchanan was made.
Numerous Republican campaign songs also derided the lack of manhood they saw
evident in Buchanan’s refusal to stand up to the slave power. One song argued that when
Buchanan had “grown old his party thought/they’d take Uncle James by the nose/And put
him up in a fight they fought/With slavery’s host of foes.”118 The Democratic Party was
leading Buchanan, not the other way around, according to this song. Another song
referred to Buchanan as “slavery’s hack” who had “no spine in his back.” Shortly before
election day, yet another song announced that, “We cannot vote for Buchanan/In a few
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days, in a few days/Because he is not a freeman.” By saying Buchanan was not a
freeman, the lyricist of this song, and everyone who sang it, was saying that Buchanan
was equal to a slave, and therefore not an ideal man. One Republican campaign song
made the connection they saw between doing the bidding of the slave power and
becoming a slave oneself even more explicitly: “For freedom is dear—Southerners can’t
rule here/For we’re not their niggers, that’s very clear/For we’re not their niggers, that’s
very clear!/For they can’t govern us, that’s so, so, so!/For they shan’t govern us, that’s
so!”119 The song implied that if one lacked mastery over oneself, if one was governed by
Southerners, meaning the slave power, one lacked a defining characteristic of a freeman.
At this time ideal manhood was something only white men could claim; in fact manhood
was defined by the exclusion of those who could not claim independence over
themselves: women, children, and slaves.120 Whereas Murphy argued that during the
Progressive Era the homosexual other was used as a foil to help define manhood through
excluding those who were deemed unmanly, in the Antebellum Era the unmanly and
dependent other was a slave.121 This was true in the North as much as the South. The
above song demonstrates a fear that the Southern slave power is trying to take away
Northern white men’s independence. They allowed themselves to be governed by
Southern interests they would be reduced to the status of slaves, a change that they resist
throughout the song. According to them Buchanan lacked the manly independence
necessary to protect not just his own, but their manhood as well.
Anti-Buchanan political cartoons published during the campaign are a third primary
source available to historians that showed Northerners criticizing Buchanan’s lack of
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mastery over himself and insinuated that that lack of self-mastery made him less of a
man. One of the less subtle ones showed Buchanan lying down horizontally and serving
as a literal platform:122

The nominee is propped up by prominent Doughfaces like Pierce and Senator
Thomas Hart Benton, and via a speech bubble is saying, “I am no longer James Buchanan
but the platform of my party.” A slave and his owner are sitting on top of platformBuchanan, literally being supported by him. The slave owner is holding a whip in one
hand and a gun in the other, and his speech bubble says, “I don’t care anything about the
supporters of the platform as long as their platform supports me and my nigger.”123 The
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argument of the image was that the slave owner was the one with the power, the
Doughfaces on their hands and knees were the base of his support, and Buchanan, servile
to the wishes of both those under him and above him, was practically irrelevant. If he
were removed from the image the slave owner and his slave would just be sitting on the
other Democrats. In this image he was portrayed as literally not a man, just a plank to
support those who control him. More frequently than any other attack against his
manhood, Buchanan’s lack of independence was discussed seriously in conventions, and
mocked through numerous campaign songs and editorial cartoons. This argument
implied that Buchanan’s manhood could be determined via his party devotion, just as it
was thought that the type of man he was could reveal the policies he would pursue as
President of the United States.

The Role of Buchanan’s Bachelorhood

While his lack of mastery over himself was the chief complaint made against
Buchanan during the election, his bachelor status did receive some attention during the
campaign as well.
Interestingly, there is only one recorded instance of the speakers at either national
convention mentioning Buchanan’s bachelorhood. As already mentioned, no statement
was made about it at the Republican National Convention, when delegates already knew
that their nominee would be running against Buchanan. The only speaker who addressed
the subject at the Democratic National Convention did so in the speech immediately
following Buchanan’s official clinching of the nomination. Colonel Samuel Black of
Pennsylvania, coming to the close of a speech praising his party’s nominee, said, “Mr.
53

Buchanan, we confess, is a bachelor. But the reason is a complete vindication as will, I
am sure, satisfy every gentleman here present. It is this—as soon as James Buchanan
was old enough to marry, he became wedded to the Constitution of his country, and the
laws of Pennsylvania do not allow a man to have more than one wife.”124 While meant as
a humorous remark Black also demonstrated political savvy. Calling one an adherent to
the Constitution, especially in front of the Southern-dominated Democratic Party, was a
loaded choice of words akin to describing someone as being for “state’s rights” during
the Civil Rights Era one hundred years later. Colonel Black’s statement essentially said,
“Do not worry about the particulars of the man; he is for our policies.” This was another
way of saying what Buchanan himself said to the electorate: do not worry about who I am
as a person, I am for the Democratic Party’s platform. For Democrats like Preston
Brooks in the South, and to crucial Northern democrats in states like Pennsylvania, this
proved to be a winning argument. The need to “vindicate” Buchanan’s bachelorhood
with a satisfactory reason suggests an awareness that his single status was a defiance of
norms that could potentially make their candidate vulnerable, but not to the extent that
the topic could not be joked about. Perhaps doing so was a conscious attempt to
minimize the damage the issue could bring to the campaign by framing it as a trivial.
Based on the election results it appears the majority of the electorate agreed with that
assessment.
In contrast with the conventions however, both Buchanan’s and Fremont’s marital
status received attention in campaign biographies, in Republican campaign songs, and in
the partisan press. The Fremont campaign publicly celebrated their candidate’s marriage
with Jesse Fremont, daughter of one of the most famous Democratic senators of the age,
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Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri. Decades earlier Fremont and 17-year-old Jesse Benton
had caused a national scandal when they eloped against the wishes of her powerful father.
Benton eventually gave in to his daughter’s refusal to part with Fremont, allowed the
young couple to live in his house, and used his connections to secure employment for the
Pathfinder, as he was known, getting him a job surveying land out west. In 1856 this
family squabble became front-page news again when Thomas Hart Benton endorsed and
campaigned for Buchanan over his own son-in-law.125 In Free Hearts and Free Homes
Pierson argued that the elopement with Jessie “enabled Republicans to fashion John into
a model of idealized masculinity.”126 Unlike Colonel Black talking about Buchanan’s
marital status, Fremont’s supporters did not feel the need to make jokes about his
elopement. Rather than an embarrassing scandal from Fremont’s past that should be
avoided, Republican speakers like Kansas Governor Charles Robinson argued that, “the
man who dared to take the responsibility of captivating and running away with Jessie
Benton in defiance of [her father]—such a man will not hesitate to take the responsibility
to wipe out the policy and corruptions of Frank Pierce from the White House.”127 In
other words, Fremont’s marriage, and specifically the manly qualities he demonstrated by
eloping with Jessie, would have positive policy implications. Unlike Buchanan, a tool of
the slave power, Congressman Burlingame of Massachusetts claimed that John and
Jessie’s elopement demonstrated that the Republican candidate “was a man who could
not be driven, who could not be scared.”128 The argument to voters was that just as he
had stood up to Senator Benton, Fremont was manly and independent enough to stand up
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to the slave power and those Doughface Northerners and Southern politicians who, in
their view, supported the slave power under the guise of preserving the national union
between the states. It is likely the effectiveness of the argument was enhanced by those
inclined to believe it by the fact that Senator Benton himself was one of those politicians.
Fremont would not be a tool like Buchanan; he would continue to be a freeman of action
who was brave enough to take what he wanted. Supporters of Fremont argued that his
demonstration of manly action and independence served as a window into the kind of
policies he would implement as President of the United States.
Members of Congress were not the only ones who felt they could extrapolate
what kind of men the candidates were based on their marital statuses. While the majority
of German and Irish immigrants continued to give their support to the Democratic Party
in 1856, at least some found the difference in marital status worthy of consideration when
casting their vote. At a meeting of Germans in New York City, a speaker voiced the
question, “Shall we vote for an old bachelor, who had never the courage to take a wife?
Or shall we vote for…the man who had the courage to steal his wife when she was
refused to him?”129 Ignoring how Jessie Fremont’s independence was not considered in
this statement, the distinction drawn between an old bachelor and the courageous man
who took physical action to get what he wanted could not be more stark. There is an
implied judgment that being a bachelor was a lesser status that did not live up to the
speaker’s ideal of manhood.
These are clear cases of James Buchanan’s bachelorhood being used against him
in the political arena. None of these men ever said though that being a bachelor alone
should disqualify Buchanan from serving as President. The bachelor status supposedly
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revealed something about the character of the man, something that is seen time and time
again throughout the campaign. In contrast to Fremont, Buchanan had failed to
demonstrate that he was his own man, someone who would drive the nation, not be
driven by others. His lack of a wife was a symptom of a larger problem: Buchanan’s lack
of independence and his willingness to submit to others. Fremont’s supporters used his
marriage to Jessie to drive the narrative that he was bold, courageous, and manly. The
New York Herald wrote a pro-Fremont editorial that contrasted the two candidates thusly:
“Through his whole life [Buchanan] has been a cold and timid man, following in the
wake of other men, while Fremont has been a veritable and notable pioneer, leading the
way in the path of empire, and opening up hitherto unknown regions to science and
Anglo-Saxon civilization.”130 This was already an established narrative: one candidate
was a follower while the other was a leader. One was a tool, a Doughface willing to
submit to Southern wishes, while the other was “the Pathfinder,” a man who blazed his
own trail. Marital status fit into that narrative, and received significant attention during
the election, but in speeches and partisan newspapers it was merely a piece of larger
narratives about the candidates based around policy issues and ideals of manhood.
In contrast, Republican campaign songs frequently mentioned Buchanan’s
bachelorhood. Most references were only a line or two, such as “they say of true
manhood, he hasn’t a drop/Who has not the courage the question to pop.”131 Similar to
the convention speeches and newspaper editorials, these lyrics were a humorous way to
connect his bachelor status to larger narratives of the campaign that were already
established, that Buchanan lacked the courage necessary to meet ideals of manhood.
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Often bachelorhood was only brought up at the end of songs that focused on other aspects
of the election. For example, one song that was mainly devoted to extolling the virtues of
Fremont only references Buchanan’s lack of a spouse in the final verse: “Then hurrah for
Fremont, and Jessie too/And with them we’ll beat the bach’lor man!/We should, we will,
we can--/And with them we’ll beat old Buchan!”132 Fremont is great enough to deserve
your vote all on his own, the song argued, but with a Republican win the voter will also
get Jessie too, whereas “the bach’lor man” only comes by himself. Similarly, another
song saw his bachelorhood as an additional way to put down Buchanan in contrast to
Fremont. After attacking Buchanan for various reasons, chief among them being the oftrepeated criticism that he was a “tool” of the plantation owners, the song ended by
criticizing that Buchanan had “no dearer self/The partner of his soul/Fremont has got a
“better half”/And what must be the whole!/And in the old White House shall send/Sweet
music to the aisles/And like a Jessiemine will wreath/Its perch with flowering smiles.”133
But both of these songs treat the marital status of the two major candidates as one issue
among many, and certainly not the issues that are at the top of the list of complaints.
Additionally, these songs seem to be capitalizing on pro-Jessie Fremont sentiment
at least as much as negative feelings related to bachelorhood. Songs that reference that
Fremont was married tend to mention Jessie by name, either directly or, as in the case of
the last song, indirectly by making a play on the name of the Jessamine flower. Jessie
Fremont biographers like Candice Shy Hooper have argued that Jessie was wildly
popular among the Republican electorate. Hooper, reflecting on the many ways that the
election of 1856 was a historic campaign, added that it was also “the first presidential
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election in which a candidate’s wife was prominently featured in a positive manner.”134
Banners at rallies often celebrated both “John and Jessie” and one went even further by
excluding John Fremont all together: “Jessie for the White House.” Hooper argued that
“the nascent Republican Party seized upon Jessie’s popularity and her talents to attract
attention to it.” 135 Certainly her inclusion in so many Republican campaign songs
supports that conclusion. It is likely that some of this criticism of Buchanan’s
bachelorhood was simply a way for Republicans to continue keeping the politically
popular Jessie Benton-Fremont in the mind of voters as much as possible. Rallies were
designed to excite larger swaths of the electorate compared to the conventions, which,
especially in the nineteenth century, focused more on party platforms and policy
distinctions. Therefore it makes sense that the rallies gave more attention to the
candidate’s popular wife, and also referenced Buchanan’s lack of a wife more frequently,
than either party felt compelled to do at their national conventions.
Finally, there is an oft-cited political cartoon that mocked Buchanan’s
bachelorhood while simultaneously making the more consistent criticism that the
candidate lacked manly independence and changed his policy positions whenever
advantageous.136
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The image is of Buchanan sitting alone in a dark room looking sad and trying to
mend an old coat above the caption “Reverie of a Bachelor”, an allusion to the title of a
popular non-fiction book of the same name published in 1850. All of this subtly
highlighted that Buchanan lacked a wife, like Jessie Fremont perhaps, who could mend
his clothing for him. The illustrator may have wanted viewers to pity Buchanan, but
certainly he was not a man to admire or vote for. This cartoon is one of the most cited by
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historians when discussing the election of 1856 or just Buchanan in general, especially
when claiming his known gay identity.137 The focus is almost always solely on the jabs
taken at Buchanan’s single status. Writers like Loewen argue that Buchanan sewing, a
gendered action associated with femininity, was evidence that people during his time
knew that he was involved in a homosexual relationship. Once a person understands the
political issues of the period however, a closer look at the cartoon reveals that while it did
indeed poke fun at Buchanan’s bachelorhood the main attack of the cartoon was about his
flip-flopping on slavery’s expansion. In the cartoon, while working alone in the dark
room Buchanan mutters to himself, “My old coat was a very fashionable Federal coat
when it was new, but by patching and turning I have made it quite a Democratic
garment.” To the politically aware in 1856, or those who studied the political history of
the 1850s, this would be an obvious jab at Buchanan’s shifting party allegiances, a clever
way of referencing that this Democrat used to be a part of the Federalist Party. The
cartoon version of Buchanan goes on to remark, “That Cuba patch to be sure is rather
unsightly but it suits Southern fashions at this season.” The coat does indeed have a
newly (and somewhat clumsily) sewn on patch that says “CUBA” in large letters. This
references Buchanan’s expansionist desire to annex Cuba as a territory of the United
States, a desire shared by most southern Democrats and loathed by Republicans because
both believed that Cuba’s climate and geography would likely lead to the expansion of
slavery.138 The critique here is again twofold. Buchanan the bachelor cannot sew well,
but the cartoon more seriously criticized him for taking policy positions based on the
“fashions of the season” and supporting what he knew to be “unsightly” in order to win
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Southern favor. Finally, Buchanan’s speech bubble ends by mentioning his bachelorhood
explicitly. Cartoon Buchanan says, “If I am elected, let me see, $25,000 per annum, and
no rent to pay, and no women and babies about, I guess I can afford a new outfit.” The
sad old lonely man in the image, whom the illustrator wanted the audience to understand
had no spouse or children that he cared for like Fremont, could very well get a new coat
if he was elected to the White House. The jab at the bachelorhood, the personal attack, is
undeniable, but it is not about homosexuality. Like all good political cartoons there is a
more complex statement beneath the jab though. The political argument was about his
lack of adhesion to principle, that just as he once transformed his Federalist coat into a
Democratic one, no one can be sure what kind of coat, or what policy positions,
Buchanan would actually stick to if he was elected President of the United States. As has
been seen, this argument was made against Buchanan everywhere during the campaign of
1856: not just in this political cartoon, but in the partisan press, in campaign songs at
rallies, and even at the conventions that failed to make an issue of his bachelorhood.

Conclusion

Buchanan’s bachelorhood was repeatedly commented upon during the American
presidential campaign of 1856, but the election results prove that it was a status that
voters were willing to look past. While campaign songs and political cartoons mocked
Buchanan for not having a spouse, being unmarried was not discussed as disqualifying in
and of itself, even by Buchanan’s political opponents. To them, his bachelorhood was
rather a symptom of Buchanan’s larger defects as a leader. To Southerners Buchanan was
not enough of a fighter; to many Northerners he lacked manly independence. Both groups
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preferred other men as leaders, men who more closely performed their ideal of “martial
manhood.” Once Buchanan became the nominee and promised to uphold the Democratic
Party’s platform, Southerners backed him with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The
Southern states alone would not have won him the election however. Buchanan’s
electoral victory depended on support from Northern Democrats. For those voters,
Buchanan’s “restrained manhood” was appealing since these moderate voters hoped for a
man who could keep the peace. In 1856 a martial type of manhood was defeated at the
polls and a restrained type of manhood was elevated to the White House.
However, while restrained manhood triumphed politically in 1856, calls for a
more “martial manhood” at the Republican National Convention illuminate the existence
of an appreciation of that ideal in the North as well as the South. And in the next election,
the election of 1860, the country chose Abraham Lincoln, a man the Republican Party
portrayed as a rough frontiersman just as they had with Fremont only four years earlier.
Once Johnson finished Lincoln’s term there were seven men who served as president
before Theodore Roosevelt assumed the office. Six of those seven had fought in the Civil
War. It appears a restrained type of manhood fell out of favor even before the rise of
Roosevelt and the simultaneous construction of the homosexual identity. Was this
perhaps due to feelings caused by the failures of the Buchanan administration? Or the
expansion of the commander-in-chief aspect of the presidency under Lincoln? More
broadly, are there patterns to when America has sought a restrained man in the White
House versus someone who appears more combative? What can these patterns tell us
about a given time’s process of creating manhood? Further study is needed.
It is possible that no amount of further study will ever tell us whether James
Buchanan and William King had a sexual relationship. Even if that could be proved it
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would still be inaccurate to call James Buchanan our first “gay” president, since that
category of identity did not exist during his lifetime. James Buchanan was still a unique
figure in American history however, and not just for being the only lifelong bachelor to
be elected president. He was also a man who was elected President of the United States
due in part to the fact that his personality was determined to be more feminine in nature
than his opponent’s. He was elected because of, and not despite, these perceptions. Many
who like to speculate that Buchanan was “gay” are interested in him because they are
seeking leaders from the past who challenged dominant gender ideals. While Buchanan’s
feminine masculinity was actually idealized by many in 1856, a Progressive Era man
deemed to be feminine could find his political career in ruins, as detailed in Murphy’s
study. It is often erroneously assumed however that that is the way that it always was.
Therefore, those wishing to challenge historical assumptions regarding gender ideals can
still use the example of Buchanan: his election in 1856 is evidence that the interplay
between gender ideals and presidential politics has been more complex and varied than is
often understood.
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